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March 30, 2001
Kurt M. Campbell is senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
This essay is a condensed version of a recent presentation to FPRI’s InterUniversity Study Group on the U.S. and Asia; the full version will appear in the summer issue of Orbis, FPRI’s quarterly journal of world affairs. The Study Group meets bimonthly under the chairmanship of Avery Goldstein, director of FPRI’s Asia Program.
The last ten years have led many observers to expect predictability and rationality in the progression of Asian events. In strategic terms, Asia experienced nothing as pressing as the reunification of Germany, NATO enlargement, or the disintegration of Yugoslavia. However, the immediate future in Asia is likely to provide a real test of the ingenuity and leadership of the new Bush administration.
Some commentators have tended to play down the consequences for Asia of the conclusion of superpower competition, but the end of the Cold War in fact triggered a series of crucial events in Asia whose ultimate manifestations will only be realized in the coming years.
The end of U.S.-Soviet rivalry removed the most obvious rationale for Sino-U.S. cooperation, and leaders in Washington and Beijing have yet to identify a foundation upon which their strategic relationship will be built. Japan, too, has begun to question its long-standing security arrangements with the United States and reexamine its own defense identity in Asia. North Korea, now truly isolated, was forced to rely increasingly on its philosophy of self-sufficiency while embarking on daring diplomatic gambits such as high-stakes summits with South Korea and the United States. The Cold War’s end also reduced the apparent significance of Southeast Asian states as pieces on a global chessboard, and the rationale for bolstering undemocratic regimes disintegrated. Once-dominant Russia seemed unlikely to reemerge as an important actor in Asia. Finally, the United States began the 1990s in apparent decline, its energies allegedly wasted during costly, protracted superpower competition. Yet by the end of the decade, it was a “hyper-power” unmatched in every dimension of national capabilities.
Whatever Asia’s commercial promise and political dynamism, the reality is that it is a region fraught with danger. Any of three situations could trigger a conflagration virtually overnight: the still-perilous division of the Korean peninsula, the increasingly tense and unpredictable situation across the Taiwan Strait, and the volatile nuclear competition between India and Pakistan. At the same time, every major state is in the midst of profound change. It is important to review briefly some of these trends to gain a clearer picture of the shifting strategic landscape.
Perhaps the most important place to search for signs of strategic change in the Asia-Pacific is the United States. American elites increasingly share the view that their country’s future is tied to Asian fortunes. American financial and trade statistics have long reflected the importance of Asia, but now U.S. military attention to the Asian theater is catching up. The last several years have seen renewed American efforts to revitalize bilateral security ties with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines. At the same time, however, forward deployment of U.S. forces is attracting opposition in Japan and South Korea.
Most of Asia has long desired a more attentive and engaged partner in Washington. Now, ironically, the worry in Asian capitals is that the United States is preoccupied with China and may be veering toward confrontation. Taiwan, it is feared, could be the catalyst for serious conflict. Asians seek to avoid a major crisis, but at the same time do not want to see the United States forced to back down. While there is always hope of diplomatic progress between Taipei and Beijing, uncertainty about cross-strait security grows along with missile buildups, military exercises, and the introduction of new military technologies.
A further dimension of this new American focus on Asia is U.S. predominance in military affairs, commerce, information, and culture. In many ways, this is a truly remarkable turnaround from the political-military aftershocks of the Vietnam War and the apparent economic malaise of the late 1980s. However, this unprecedented power has led Asian countries to ponder how to take advantage of American influence and simultaneously contain or undermine it. Most Asian states appreciate and desire a degree of leadership from Washington, but not too much. As one Asian ambassador in Washington explains, “The current analogy between U.S. global dominance and Microsoft’s commanding market share is very compelling. Like Microsoft, we want to see U.S. power weakened, but at the same time we use and appreciate the operating system it provides.” The contradictions in the Asian attitudes toward the United States will likely be a lingering feature in Asian security diplomacy.
China has taken a leading role in seeking to undermine the U.S. position in Asia, voicing frequent criticisms of the forward U.S. presence and bilateral security ties. Chinese leaders apparently also see the increased American focus on Asia as part of a “containment strategy,” the existence of which is now taken as an article of faith among senior People’s Liberation Army officers. Increasingly, U.S. and Chinese positions diverge on prickly issues such as nonproliferation and regional diplomacy.
China has worked tirelessly to strengthen bilateral ties of its own, especially in Southeast Asia, by capitalizing on its economic potential, size, and location. Since the middle of the decade, the People’s Republic has concluded confidence-building and security agreements with every country it borders, reflecting an ambitious redirection of national focus toward trade and diplomacy in the east and south. It has also taken steps to rebuild its relationship with Russia, both as a source for modern military hardware and as a diplomatic hedge against the perceived excesses of U.S. power.
While Japan continues to wallow in the economic doldrums, its people are displaying a tendency toward greater assertiveness internationally. Their changing attitudes about security raise critical questions about the long-term viability of the U.S.-Japanese partnership. Many Japanese want their country to play a more “normal” role in the security sphere and enlarge its participation in U.N. peacekeeping and regional military activities. Tokyo grows increasingly frustrated over Beijing’s refusal to acknowledge Japan’s legitimate security concerns and potentially significant role in the region, while Beijing continues to bring up reminders of Japan’s wartime misdeeds. The Japanese also want and need to be consulted more by the United States on security issues that impact them.
Russia is showing signs of reemerging as an Asian power after being absent for most of the 1990s. Vladimir Putin has made clear that his country has a diplomatic role to play on the Korean peninsula. Russia is also reviving its stalled diplomacy with Japan over official ties and the status of contested territory. Finally, Russia’s decision to form a united diplomatic front with China against the United States and provide Beijing with modern military technology signals one of the most significant and troubling developments of the late 1990s.
South Korea is both the most likely scene of significant strategic change in Asia and the driving force behind this change. President Kim Dae Jung’s determined diplomacy has opened an unprecedented window of opportunity with Pyongyang. However, the most significant development has been the emergence of a strategic consensus toward North Korea among the United States, South Korea, and Japan, which has also garnered support from Beijing. Nonetheless, in the event of a clash between North and South or the collapse of the North, this alignment of views among the major powers may not survive. One vexing issue on the horizon is the possibility of continuing (or even expanding) the security ties between a unified or tension-free Korea and the United States, a matter that has already led to diplomatic sparring between Beijing and Washington.
Indonesia is most notable for its retreat from the international scene since the onset of its domestic difficulties. After being a driving force in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) throughout much of the past decade, internal matters currently preclude any focus on other issues and have caused a discernible loss of momentum in ASEAN as a whole. Asian concerns stem from the potential for upheaval and disunity in the world’s fourth-largest country, the shockwaves this would send to its neighbors, and the fear that with Indonesia otherwise engaged or distracted, Southeast Asia could lose its coherence and much of its former influence.
Strategic uncertainty has led many Asian states to pursue ambitious diplomatic agendas with key states, especially China, and simultaneously develop stronger security ties with the United States. However, the most obvious way to hedge in the security sphere is by seeking to acquire greater military capabilities. Trends in the two most powerful Asian countries, China and Japan, bear the closest scrutiny.
China still has a relatively outmoded military, but is rapidly upgrading its military plans and hardware. Especially since the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96, the country has strived to increase its military options against Taiwan by investing in missiles, fighter aircraft, and C4I capabilities (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence).
Japan, by contrast, has a relatively sophisticated military boasting high-performance fighter aircraft, Aegis-class destroyers, and a well-trained army. But it has also been engaged in a protracted internal deliberation as to whether to amend the nation’s restrictive constitution concerning the use of force in situations beyond self-defense. Japan is in the process of revising the so-called Defense Guidelines, which could someday determine the nature of the country’s involvement in regional contingencies, peacekeeping, and U.N. operations. Simply put, China has the will to assert itself but not the capabilities, while Japan has long possessed the wherewithal but lacks the national consensus. Both could have a crucial bearing on the security situation in the region as a whole.
Several other Asian states were in the midst of significant military modernization efforts in 1997 when the economic crisis hit. Most are only now looking again at incremental modernization programs as their economies rebound. Generally speaking, they still have relatively modest arsenals.
Perhaps the most important military developments in recent years in Asia have to do with the United States. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Clinton administration began revitalizing bilateral security ties and expanding American military training and deployments in Asia. As a senior member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff remarked, “the services are going to Asia because that is where the action is going to be in the future, without a doubt.” At the same time, the forward troop presence is facing greater public opposition in Japan and South Korea, especially in Okinawa.
The military development that has the greatest potential to roil regional relations is the American desire to build a ballistic missile defense system with the potential to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles launched by “rogue states” such as North Korea. In addition, possible American arms sales to Taiwan could trigger another downturn in Sino-U.S. relations just as contacts have begun to recover after the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.
There are no genuine multilateral security institutions in Asia, because Asian states have been reluctant either to sacrifice national sovereignty or legitimate any form of collective security. Existing regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) promote dialogue, not collective defense. Peace and stability since 1975 have rested on the presence of roughly 100,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, and marines, and American bilateral ties with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Virtually no country in Asia is fully satisfied with the status quo, but it has often seemed preferable to a security framework that might escalate a crisis to the point of military action. Moreover, in recent years economic recovery has taken precedence over security.
The last decade has been remarkably placid in Asia, and this relative quiescence has no doubt weakened any push for bold action in the area of multilateralism and regional security. The Korean peninsula has grown increasingly militarized, but an unstable peace has prevailed. In addition, the dispatch of two U.S. carrier battle groups to the waters around Taiwan in 1996 was seen as a signal of American determination to deter further military provocation.
The most notable multilateral security challenge in recent years was the U.N.-sanctioned, Australian-led military intervention to restore order in East Timor in 1999. This operation, in which the United States played only a supporting role, has been seized on by some Americans as a model for future interventions, but the conditions that led to the coalition’s success will be difficult to replicate. In addition, Australia’s experience is seen by many in Asia as a cautionary tale to be avoided in the future, making the intervention an unlikely precedent for Asia-Pacific security cooperation.
Perhaps the most important step the United States can take in the period ahead will be to embark upon a period of deep, sustained strategic dialogue with Japan, the linchpin in overall U.S. strategy in Asia. The two countries need to compare perceptions on a wide range of issues critical to the whole region. Discussion should address the Korean peninsula, China, national missile defense (NMD), the Taiwan Strait, and the implications of political incoherence within ASEAN. Fundamentally, Japan and the United States must find ways to address common problems, encourage positive trends in the region, and develop contingency plans for potential setbacks. Even if nothing else on the security agenda can be accomplished, however, reviving a true strategic conversation between the United States and Japan is crucial to the preservation of peace and stability in a broader Asian context. For those who argue that Japan is a “wasting asset” in irreversible decline, it might be useful to recall that only a decade ago it was taken as an article of faith that American power was waning around the world. Japan will continue to play a vital political and economic role for decades to come.
The next item on the U.S. agenda should be the design of a new framework for U.S., Japanese, and South Korean cooperation. The initial rationale for trilateral cooperation in the mid-1990s was the challenge posed by North Korea, but it is time to develop a more formal security framework. Such an understanding could reassure the three states as they confront fundamental changes in North Korea, and create institutions and procedures that transcend the division of Korea.
Thirdly, the Pentagon must maintain the forward deployment of U.S. forces, a key ingredient in U.S. strategy in the Pacific for nearly half a century. However, there are simply too many eggs in too few baskets. The United States needs to move away from its nearly total reliance on bases in Northeast Asia and develop facilities and training regimes throughout the region, especially in Southeast Asia and Australia. Doing so would alleviate the sense among South Korean and Japanese hosts that their burden is disproportionate. Operational military doctrine must also be revised to allow for the long-term deployments of smaller groupings of forces so as to move away from the overseas garrison model. Finally, American planners must focus their attentions on actual military capabilities rather than total numbers of soldiers, sailors, and marines as the measure of their power and resolve.
Russia currently has one major avenue for interaction with Asia: China. Hence, a fourth American goal should be to broaden Russia’s overall engagement with the region. Washington should seek to restore the on-again, off-again negotiations between Japan and Russia, and seize on Russia’s desire for a greater diplomatic role on the Korean peninsula.
As a fifth goal, the United States should promote discussions with allies and friends on national and theater missile defense. The Bush administration must explain American thinking and take the concerns of its partners seriously.
The sixth goal of American diplomacy in Asia should be to emphasize multilateralism, which it can do in three ways. One is to promote multilateralism inside the ARF through, for example, dialogue on previously difficult or taboo areas such as the Taiwan Strait and Korea, and expanded plans for cooperative peacekeeping or responses to natural disasters.
A second path is to accelerate “track two” (unofficial) discussions among China, the United States, and Japan. It is certainly premature to consider any formal mechanism for security communication, but unofficial contacts could begin to build trust and confidence. To do so requires that each country reassure the others and attenuate deep-seated suspicions. That is no easy task, but it is hard to imagine long-term peace and stability in Asia unless the three major powers achieve a strategic modus vivendi.
The third way to promote multilateralism is to encourage the states of Northeast Asia to develop their own security forum. Beijing has been cool to the concept in the past, but the new conditions in the region will test whether it is now interested in stable multilateralism or simply seeks to reduce U.S. power. The State Department should also revisit the possibility of six-party security and economic discussions about the Korean peninsula, drawing in both Japan and Russia. Russia’s political standing in Pyongyang has risen substantially, and it is vital to have a more active Japanese role when discussing economic and humanitarian matters related to North Korea.
The United States faces a dilemma when it comes to its role in Asian security. Signs of American enthusiasm for multilateralism have stoked fears in the past of a flagging U.S. commitment. On the other hand, talk of boosting the American presence has evoked suspicions of a scheme to contain China. Moreover, many Asians fear China, but are alienated by overt signs of American hostility toward it. Conversely, fears of a future American withdrawal tempt Asians to cozy up to China. Such perverse perceptions suggest that leadership on multilateral initiatives should arise from within the region and then gain support from Washington, rather than the other way around.
The poorly understood but oft-discussed Pacific Century is now dawning, and the major foreign-policy challenges confronting the United States in the immediate future will likely arise from Asia. Trade friction between the United States and Asia, long dormant because of the strength of the U.S. economy, will return with a vengeance if American growth slows significantly. In addition, the lack of any coherent security architecture in Asia may prove to be the most critical flaw in the years ahead.
The Bush administration’s objectives in Asia show at least rhetorical recognition of the importance of the region, but that is merely a good start. Reassuring formal allies and friends of America’s continued involvement will go a long way toward heading off a perception of disinterest or inattention that could lead to greater unilateralism on the part of anxious partners. Furthermore, some form of commercial and political engagement with China will be fundamental to the success of U.S. foreign policy in Asia. The key will be to pursue engagement while simultaneously preparing for its potential failure. Only an engagement strategy will give the United States the diplomatic credibility to implement a successful containment strategy if it should ever become necessary.
Other far-reaching challenges also confront the new administration, including the forthcoming decision on NMD. Broadly speaking, the Bush team will have to work hard to sustain public commitment to U.S. foreign engagement in general. But there is little choice: long-term stability and security will be directly affected by policy decisions taken by the United States during the next few years.
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