FPRI Wire

Managing Ethnic Conflict

The Perlmutter Lecture on Ethnic Conflict

Volume 6, Number 5
September 1998

by I. William Zartman

Dr. Zartman is the Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organization and Conflict Resolution and Director of African Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

On April 27, 1998, FPRI inaugurated The Perlmutter Lectures on Ethnic Conflict with an address by I. William Zartman, one of the nation’s leading authorities on conflict resolution. These lectures are made possible by contributions from Dr. Howard V. Perlmutter and Dr. Foulie Psalidas-Perlmutter in memory of their parents David & Anna Perlmutter and Demetrios & Marika Psalidas. The essay below is an abridged version of the inaugural lecture.

Not all assertions of identity are conflictual. Most people can be themselves without impinging on another’s sense of self. It is when one can be oneself only at the expense of another that conflict arises. But when it does, it tends to escalate as far as it can go, to the exhaustion of resources or the elimination of one party, wreaking enormous and essentially irreparable damage on the participants. A contentious crowd of theories purport to explain this phenomenon, and this competition is important because it determines the choice of appropriate countermeasures. Unfortunately, they are only descriptive, not predictive; they explain what happens but not when.

Security dilemma theories indicate that the escalatory spiral of ethnic conflict flies out of control because one party perceives itself to be threatened and takes measures to protect itself, thus threatening the other, and on it goes. The difference between the ethnic situation and the international situation, from which the theory derives, is that in the latter the conflict is endemic and therefore its inception need not be explained, whereas in the former situation it is an epidemic whose outbreak needs explanation. A number of related theories claim that identity conflicts are a matter not of perception but of objective incompatibilities of demands; still they need to explain why competition turns violent.

Ethnic nepotism theory indicates that people hire their own kind to promote survival, but that this then leads to distributive conflicts. The theory is insightful as a beginning but it does not indicate the cause of ethnic politicization, which is, after all, the element to be explained. A few politicized ethnic groups can correspond to a situation of identity conflict but a large number of such groups, even highly politicized, or a situation characterized by a dominant group, are less likely to produce conflict.

Social identity theory suggests that unequal distribution of resources produces conflict when the subordinate group rejects its previously accepted negative self-image, and with it the status quo, and starts working toward the development of a positive group identity. When social identity based on intergroup comparisons is unsatisfactory, individuals will either strive to leave the group for a better identity or make their own group more positively distinct, thus causing conflict. But since inferior groups are often satisfied in their inferiority, something not identified by the theory makes the group dissatisfied with its self-image and the status quo.

Development theory addresses this problem by indicating that an established pecking order among identity groups will be called into question when exogenous changes provide new opportunities for achievemental mobility that the old order did not allow. Dominant groups then see their positions threatened by newly liberated groups.

Power transition theory underlines the momentary surge of ethnic conflicts at times when given systems of order break down. The breakdown of order is posited as the cause, not the consequence, of identity conflict. Systems of world order such as colonialism or bipolarity (the Cold War) served as systems of conflict control. When the tide of order recedes, formerly submerged islands of conflict reappear because the ordering principles and systems have left their inhabitants high and dry.

Revolutionary theory begins with Aristotle’s Motor, one of the most penetrating statements in political analysis. He states that inferiors become revolutionaries in order to be equals and equals in order to be superiors. The notion is refined in the “relative deprivation” thesis: when deprived but improving groups' expectations of continued improvement are frustrated, or when their improving conditions experience a downturn, conflict can break out.

Yet none of these theories tells when identity conflict will break out. All explain the supersaturation of the situation but none identifies the crystalizing agent, and so to the extent that they predict at all, all predict continuous or at least widespread conflict. Yet ethnic conflict is relatively rare. Happily but truly, Rwandan genocides are exceptional events. The explanation proposed here recognizes an important aspect of social reality, the element of human choice and free will. It incorporates the applicable theories as necessary but insufficient explanations, descriptions of situations ready for ethnic identity conflict. To them must be added the personally motivated political actor who sees and seizes the described situation as vulnerable to his blandishments and ready for conflict. Without the necessary conditions, the political entrepreneur would have no fodder to light, but without the agent contestataire the tinder will lie inert. Loose tinder lying around only excites pyromaniacs, it does not create them; they must pass by and see the opportunity. This explanation suggests that remedies for identity conflicts are themselves insufficient if they address only the underlying conditions, since the agent is best placed to keep stoking the fires of identity conflict. They suggest that targeting the agent with appropriate countermeasures is as important as dealing with the conditions themselves and that these measures are appropriate before, during, and after the conflict.

Prevention of Identity Conflict

It is impossible to prevent the general conditions which give rise to identity conflicts. That is for a different world beyond the skies. Yet prevention is unquestionably more efficient and more effective than efforts to resolve conflicts once begun — more efficient because of the enormous savings in lives and resources; more effective because the intervening stages of conflict make efforts to repair even more difficult than efforts to prevent. Three such measures are recommended.

The conditions leading to identity conflict can be brought under scrutiny, and eventually control, through the establishment of agreed standards at the beginning of regime building. Benchmarks already exist in the environmental field, concerning some 200 standards for emissions and pollutants, and reports on social and political indicators are already published by various UN agencies and by others. Regularly reported indicators on ethnic politicization and ethnic allocation in government positions and programs would provide a monitor of the potential for conflict. Equal opportunity and even affirmative action practices are needed to remove ascriptive discrimination. If the government itself will not respond to prodding, it may need more specific incentives from outside. An ethnic conditionality attached to aid programs could foster political as well as economic development.

Inaccurate information available to the parties about the intentions of the other side has also been identified as a contributor to conflictual conditions. The best way to provide accurate information between groups is to have them interact. The political purpose of such dialogue is not to disarm the extremists but to create a robust middle ground which can resist the entrepreneurs of conflict. Analyses of ethnic relations are torn between contact theory and anti- contact theory, which indicate that familiarity breeds content and familiarity breeds contempt, respectively. Nonetheless, properly practiced, dialogue among ethnic groups has been effective in improving intergroup relations.

As conflict looms or the first round of conflict has come to a stalemate but before the massacres have set in, a very different type of measure may be needed to prevent deadly escalation. Groups need to be separated and protected before productive dialogue and the restoration of peace can be accomplished. This requires an interposition force from external sources, since the domestic forces of order are inevitably compromised by the conflict.

These proposals are scarcely exhaustive, but they indicate that efforts to reduce identity conflicts cannot seek to eliminate the broad conditions which give rise to such conflict but rather should attempt to cushion or separate the identity situation from the surrounding conditions. In this way, the vulnerability of identity groups to the campaigns of agents contestataires will be reduced.

Reconstruction After Identity Conflict

After the conflict has escalated out of control, it is much more difficult to put the pieces back together. In such situations, human nature seems to be torn between profound urges toward normalization, putting it all behind us, and toward dealing with deep wounds, including denial and revenge, simultaneous drives in opposing directions, both for forgiveness and for nonforgiveness. Both the directions and the contradiction between them pose problems for remedial measures. Two categories of measures are recommended.

The most important response ties these opposite drives to the two different types of causes of ethnic conflict. Reconciliation would require a denial of the need for justice and let the perpetrators of the violence go free, whereas justice would require a denial or a postponement of reconciliation until every old score is settled. In identity conflicts, there are scores on both sides, and settling them is merely perpetuating the conflict. But identity conflicts are mass conflicts and the guilty are legion. How to mete out justice to the evildoers and spread healing reconciliation at the same time?

Justice can appropriately be delivered to the leaders, both as a symbolic offering and as very reality, because they are the political entrepreneurs who set fire to the tinder. Is is appropriate to blame the tinder because it is combustible? No, it is the match-striker who bears the blame. At the same time, targeted justice allows the rest of the population to reconcile, the burden of guilt now lifted. It is the confession, atonement, and forgiveness that seals the reconciliation. This is not some soft spiritual idealism; it is hard psychology and politics, long practiced as the basis of criminal justice in many traditional societies and adopted frequently today in truth and reconciliation commissions.

People who have taken up violence to realize themselves in their proclaimed identity need some recognition of their cause and identity needs as part of the deal by which they lay down their arms, or else they will take them up again. The waves of violent self-assertion in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Congo-Brazzaville, and Rwanda, among many others, show that identity conflicts are not over when they are “over” and that the self will rise again if it is not a satisfied self. A mix of separation and participation is always involved. Conflicted identities need room to be themselves, without fear and without causing fear, and so need latitude in being in charge of their own affairs. They need to be assured participation in the larger political system to protect their autonomy. Whatever the institutional formula for governance, a certain amount of conscious social engineering is required.

The negotiated ending of an ethnic conflict is rarely accomplished by the parties alone. The opportunity for the outside world to find a useful role occurs in the settlement itself and should not be passed up. Parties to identity conflicts are so engrossed in their dispute that they need a helping hand to get out.

The conclusion of this examination is that constructive attention needs to be addressed to ethnic conflicts around the world, to support active foreign involvement by both governmental and private efforts. It is too easy to sit in front of our televisions, torn between fascination and disgust, watching the latest bloody ethnic conflict in some distant land inhabited (by definition) by savages. It is even easier, as seems to be the current tendency, to turn off the TV entirely. That is irresponsible, inhuman, and dangerous to ourselves. We cannot tell people how to run their lives, but in the most basic of conflicts as in any other, we can help them out of the mud when they get stuck.

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